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Abstract 
The next Europe of regions will profoundly differ from the one we have observed so far. In fact, the 
current challenge in most European countries and regions comes from migration which is making the 
populations of Europe more and more heterogeneous. This puts great pressure on the welfare states 
and particularly on the provision of local public services. This work investigates i) whether national 
diversity reduces the performance of local public services, and ii) to what extent this problem is 
moderated by regional autonomy. The empirical analysis is based on 167 European regions: we 
employ a composite indicator developed by The QOG Institute to measure the citizens’ perception 
about local public services, and the Regional Authority Index developed by Hooghe et al. (2008a) to 
measure the level of regional autonomy; we calculate a regional diversity index based on 
nationalities  using census data. We find that diversity is negatively correlated with the performance 
of local public services, and regional autonomy only partially moderates this problem. 
Keywords: diversity; regional autonomy; local public services; European regions 
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I. Introduction 
 
The next ‘Europe of regions’ will profoundly differ from the present one. In fact, one of the most 
pressing challenges in many European countries stems from a relentless increase in the 
heterogeneity of population. This is the result of intra-European Union (EU) mobility, and migration 
from outside the EU. While some countries have already experienced such differences within their 
borders, due to their relationships with former colonies, such as France and the United Kingdom, 
and other for more recent flows related to job opportunities, such as Germany, for most European 
countries, and regions, this is going to be a new phenomenon for public policy to cope with 
(Christainsen, 2012; Dennison and Geddes, 2018).  
One of the consequences of this process is the increasing pressure on the welfare states, particularly 
regarding the provision of local basic services, such as health, public housing, local policy and 
education. Alesina and Glaeser (2004, p. 11) argue that: ‘one natural implication of our conclusion 
that fractionalization reduces redistribution is that if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to 
immigration, ethnic divisions will be used to challenge the generous welfare state’. As such, they 
raise a concern about a trade-off between a generous immigration policy and a generous welfare 
state. This is crucial for the European Union, since mobility of people represents one of its 
cornerstones. In the words of the Britain's ambassador to Berlin, Sir Sebastian Wood, “it is freedom 
of movement for workers, and not freedom of movement for 'welfare shopping”.2 This problem has 
been restated recently in a recent commentary by Branko Milanovic, a leading expert on global 
inequality, who argues that welfare states attract a lot of unskilled migrants.3 
Since in most cases local public services are either provided or managed at the region or local level, 
the regions – and the regional governments – are expected to play an increasing role in managing 
this process. Research that has addressed this issue at the subnational level has been carried out 
limited to the United States, precisely because public spending at the state level is of a different kind 
than at the county level (Cutler et al., 1993). This paper aims to inform this debate by looking at the 
issue of diversity and the provision of local public services in the European regions. 
Several studies have enquired whether the presence of a high heterogeneous population reduces 
the quality of local public policies. The answer is positive in most cases (for a recent review see 
Stichnoth and Straeten, 2013), although much of the research has addressed ethnic diversity and has 
been carried out either in the Unites States or in developing countries, in which these ethnic 
differences are considerable (e.g. Clark et al., 2013; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Kyriacou, 2012). 
Decentralization and regional autonomy have often been seen as an effective institutional setting to 
provide local public services efficiently and effective, particularly in the presence of heterogeneity of 
the population. It is not by chance that the United States, Canada and Australia, that are countries 
that have their roots in migration are among the most decentralized countries in the world, being in 
fact federal states. This is a quite common fact: countries where there are ethic or linguistic 
minorities tend to be either federal of highly decentralized, such as for instance Canada, India, 
                                                          
2 The article can be found here: https://www.thelocal.de/20160218/uk-asks-german-help-to-stop-welfare-
shopping.  
3 Here: https://www.theglobalist.com/migration-vs-the-welfare-state/.  
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Nigeria and South Africa to name a few. This is also evident in unitary countries – where it takes the 
form of asymmetric federalism – in which live minorities whose regional governments benefit from 
specific augmented forms of autonomy, as it is the case in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy 
(Congleton et al., 2003).  
Federalism, fiscal devolution, political decentralization have been the major institutional reforms 
that have been carried out with the aim of reducing the gap, perceived as increasingly larger by the 
citizens, between the government and the places (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2016; Diaz-Serrano and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2012; Filippetti and Sacchi, 2016). For these reasons, over the past decades, several 
countries have carried our reforms that go in the direction of ‘bringing the government closer to the 
people’ (Gary Marks et al., 2008). We can mention major constitutional reforms in Italy and Spain, as 
well as recent reforms in France; but also a stronger ‘voice’ rising from the bottom, through which 
regions claim for greater autonomy, as the cases of the referendum in Scotland, Cataluña, and those 
recently experienced in two regions in the North of Italy, suggest.  
This paper brings together these two streams of research that have both addressed the provision of 
local public service and public policies, but from a different angle. The former has addressed the 
relationship between diversity and local public policies; the latter has dealt with the role of 
decentralization and regional authority in the provision of local public services. More particularly, we 
investigate the relationship between diversity and the provision of local public service for European 
regions, exploring the following two research questions: i. does diversity affect the provision of local 
public services? ii. is regional autonomy a moderator between diversity and the provision of local 
public services? We do not look specifically at ethic diversity, but we rather address the issue of 
national diversity; this allows us to extend the research to a wide sample of regions hence 
addressing a broader phenomenon which is relevant for EU policy. 
The empirical analysis is based on 167 European regions. In order to measure the provision of local 
public goods at the regional level we employ the composite indicator developed by The QOG 
Institute based on the citizens’ perception about local public services (Quality of Government 
Institute, 2010; Charron and Lapuente, 2011). As far as the level of regional autonomy is concerned, 
we employ the Regional Authority Index developed by Hooghe et al. (2008a); these two indicators 
have a number of strengths and have been increasingly employed in this type of studies (e.g. 
Charron et al., 2014; Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). Finally, a variable taking into account the 
diverse composition of the population – a diversity index – is developed following other studies, 
(Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Kyriacou, 2012; Ozgen et al., 2013; Ozgen et al., 2014); the index is 
based on the census of 2011 and considers three types of residents: native citizens, foreign EU 
residents, and foreign non-EU residents.  
We find evidence that the presence of a heterogeneous composition of population in the region is 
associated to a relatively worse performance in the provision of local public goods; regional 
autonomy can act, only partially, as a moderating mechanism between diversity and local public 
services.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we put forward two hypotheses on the 
ground of research on diversity and public policies, and research on fiscal federalism; section three 
presents our measures of public services, regional authority and diversity. Section four presents the 
empirical strategy and the results, while section five discusses them and concludes. 
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II. Local public services, diversity and regional autonomy: two 
hypotheses to be tested 
 
This paper aims at bridging two different streams of research. The first deals with the impact of 
diversity on the provision of local public services. The second deals with role of federalism and 
regional autonomy, as a desirable institutional setting to deliver local public policies in the presence 
of heterogeneous communities. In what follows we derive two hypotheses regarding these two 
strands of research which are going to be tested in the empirical part.   
Diversity, local public goods and local public policies 
The provision of local public policies seems to become more problematic in the presence of a 
heterogeneous population. Alesina and Glaeser (2004), for instance, foresee a reduction of the size 
of the welfare state in Europe as a result of the increase immigration and fractionalization. Empirical 
research finds that social spending, such as expenditure for public schools, government transfers, 
health spending etc. tend to be all negatively correlated with diversity (Stichnoth and Straeten, 
2013). Several studies have addressed the phenomenon of ethnic diversity and the provision of 
public goods provision, particularly in developing countries where this phenomenon is more acute, 
suggesting several theoretical mechanisms and findings empirical evidence, that ethnic diversity 
tends to undermine local public policies, e.g. education and health (e.g. Habyarimana et al., 2007; 
Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Alesina et al. (1999) find that the shares of spending on productive 
public goods in U.S. cities are inversely related to the city's ethnic fragmentation, even after 
controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic determinants. Cross-country studies tend to 
confirm these results (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Stichnoth and Straeten, 2013)  
Two main possible arguments have been suggested to explain this finding. The first is an economic 
one, and foresees an increase in the demand of public welfare as a result of a more heterogeneous 
population. This is particularly true when migrants are relatively poorer than domestic citizens, 
which brings about an increase in the competition for local public goods. This will lead to – ceteris 
paribus – a deterioration in the provision of public services. Further, greater inequalities between 
groups have been found to undermine institutions and reduce government quality (Kyriacou, 2013). 
The second argument is more sociological in nature. As Stichnoch et (2013, p. 370) explain, “If 
citizens are more supportive of redistribution when people from their own ethnic group benefit 
from it, ethnic diversity will reduce the support for redistribution, which in turn will tend to decrease 
the actual level of redistribution”. Communities from different ethnicity can also lead to lower 
interaction, trust and social cohesion (e.g. Stolle et al., 2008; Marschall and Stolle, 2004; Camussi et 
al., 2018; Finseraas and Jakobsson, 2012), relying on the idea that an individual’s behaviour and 
engagement are affected by the characteristics of her neighbours:  
“people (both natives and immigrants) generally prefer to live among people with the same 
background and are less likely to be willing to share resources with those who they perceive 
as different from themselves. They prefer to interact socially with others who share the same 
ethnic heritage, the same socioeconomic status, the same lifestyle, and who therefore share 
common interests, experiences and tastes or, put simply, people they have more to talk 
about with.” (Tselios et al., 2017). 
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This has been recently documented not only in the urban areas of the Unites States, but also in 
several European countries (Stichnoth and Straeten, 2013). 
For the reasons outlined above we derive the following hypothesis #1: 
Hip#1 the higher the level of diversity in a region, the lower the performance in the provision 
of local public services 
Regional autonomy, diversity, and public services 
A central mechanism which connects diversity with dysfunctionality in public policy is the 
heterogeneity of preferences, in that heterogeneous tastes across ethnic groups are the channel 
through which diversity affects collective action (Alesina et al., 1999). In their study on ethnic 
diversity and public goods in Kenya, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) discuss the implications of 
decentralization of local public goods in communities characterized by high heterogeneity, and they 
raise two important arguments against the centralization of public services in these cases. Firstly, in 
many less developed countries central governments underprovide recurrent expenses. Secondly, 
centralization of funding could lead to more regional and ethnic favouritism in the allocation of 
national government funds.  
If diversity affects the economic choices, and the outcome of public policies, by directly entering 
individual preferences (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005), then decentralization and regional autonomy are 
natural candidates as effective institutional arrangements which can address the provision of local 
public services in the presence of diversity. Theories on fiscal federalism and decentralization claim 
that regional autonomy improves the quality of local governments, both in terms of the efficiency 
and the level in the provision of public goods (Hayek, 1945; Olson, 1993; Tiebout, 1956; Filippetti 
and Sacchi, 2016), accountability to citizens’ preferences (Oates, 1972), and control of the public 
expenditure (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; González-Alegre, 2015; Liberati and Sacchi, 2013). By 
making the government closer to the people, regional autonomy is expected to provide local policies 
that are better able to respond to the differentiated needs arising in highly diverse regions; hence, 
regional authority is considered an effective solution to cope with the presence of high 
heterogeneous preferences at the region/local level (Tiebout, 1956).  
When it comes to the rationale for decentralization and regional autonomy, local public services play 
a prominent role. As Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose (2011) put it, the primary aim of decentralization 
has never been about delivering greater economic growth, lowing inequality or increasing social 
capital; rather, “the original aim of decentralization is fundamentally to improve the delivering of 
public goods and services to individuals and, consequently, the level of satisfaction of the population 
with government” (p. 2, our emphasis). 
Several counter arguments have been raised. Local governments can be less efficient than central 
governments; the provision of public services can benefit from economies of scale in the case of a 
central provision; issues of capture and corruption of local policy makers are easier to observes in 
several countries (e.g. Baskaran and Feld, 2013; Tanzi, 2001). Empirical research show that countries 
with centralized governments can also deliver local public services as efficiently as decentralized 
countries do (Filippetti and Cerulli, 2017). However, these criticisms are not directed towards the 
claim that regional authority works better in heterogeneous population. 
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Following on these lines of reasoning, we put forward the second hypothesis: 
Hip#2: regional autonomy is expected to moderate between diversity and the performance of 
local public services. [Put differently, for any given level of diversity, a higher level of regional 
autonomy is expected to be associated to a higher performance of local public services]. 
III. Data: measuring the quality of local public services and the level 
of regional autonomy 
 
The provision of local public services 
The organization for the provision of local public services differs across countries depending in the 
first place upon formal provisions at the level of the constitution, according to which the type of 
state can be grouped in three broad categories: federal states, regionalized states, and unitary 
states. Firstly, we need to distinguish between exclusive competences attributed to the regional and 
local governments, and competences that are instead shared between the central government and 
the regional and local governments. Secondly, competences can be divided into legislative and 
administrative; typically, in unitary states the legislative competences belong to the central 
government, while the administrative competences can be attributed to different levels of sub-
national governments. In decentralized settings, such as federal or regionalized countries, both the 
legislative competences and the administrative competences of some local services can be 
attributed to the regional (and local) level. The revenue system for local public services also varies 
considerably across countries: in federal or regionalised states regional governments often have 
some taxation power; by contrast, in unitary states local services tend to be financed through a 
mechanism of transfers from the central government. As a result, one can observe a great deal of 
heterogeneity when it comes to the regional competences across countries regarding the provision 
of public services, even when they are local services, such as for instance in the cases of education, 
public transport, health, local police, etc. (see European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), 
2012). There are countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and 
Sweden where regions have no specific competences on their own; federal countries like Belgium, in 
which regional governments have no competences on education, or like Germany, in which instead 
the Lands have competences above a large number of services. Similar patterns can be found for 
other local public services (e.g. health).4 
This paper employs a composite indicator of the performance of local public services provided by the 
Quality of Government Survey (Charron et al., 2014; Quality of Government Institute, 2010) based on 
the citizens’ perception of three local public services: education, health and law enforcement. These 
are also those public services that are usually investigated in decentralization studies (Sacchi and 
Salotti, 2014). The indicator is a perception-based indicator built from a 34,000-respondents survey 
from 172 regions within 18 EU member states; to date, this constitutes one of the most 
                                                          
4 A comprehensive report on this issue can be consulted here: http://www.cesifo-
group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Other-Topics/Structural-Policy/Regional-Policy/DP-MC-reg-comp/fileBinary/DP-
MC-reg-comp.pdf.  
8 
 
comprehensive surveys about the quality of local public goods at the sub-national level. 5 The survey 
was undertaken between 15 December, 2009, and 1 February, 2010 and consisted of 34 questions to 
the approximately 200 respondents per region. Respondents were asked about three general public 
services in their regions – education, health care and law enforcement. In focusing on these three 
services, respondents were asked to rate their public services with respect to three related concepts, 
namely the quality, impartiality and an inverse measure of the level of corruption of these services 
(the complete questionnaire can be found in the Appendix of Quality of Government Institute, 
2010). The Survey also provides a single QoG index for each region obtained by averaging the three 
pillars - quality, impartiality and (lack of) corruption, each weighted 1/3rd. In our analysis we are 
going to use both the overall qog index performance as well as the three pillars.6 The data have been 
standardized such that the EU regional mean is ‘0’ and has a standard deviation of ‘1’. A series of 
extensive sensitivity tests to see whether changes in the model alter the final data was done. It 
arises that “data constructed here are highly robust to multiple changes in weighting and 
aggregation schemes, the removal of individual questions or alterations in the demographic make-
up of the respondents” (Quality of Government Institute, 2010).  
The Report suggests the presence of significant within-country variation from country to country. As 
explained by Charron and Lapuente (2011) the data show that the indicator of QoG is either equally 
or more important than variation between EU countries themselves. For example, some regions in 
Italy and Belgium perform like those in the best performing countries, while others rank similarly to 
low-performing regions in Hungary and Greece. This supports the case for an analysis at the region 
level. 
The degree of regional autonomy 
We employ a comprehensive measure of regional autonomy, the Regional Authority Index (RAI) 
(Hooghe et al., 2008; G. Marks et al., 2008), which includes fiscal, political, and administrative 
measures of the authority of a regional government. This index has been used in these types of 
studies replacing measures of fiscal expenditures as proxy of decentralization (e.g. Ezcurra and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2012; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). The Regional Authority Index measures 
the authority of regional governments in 42 democracies or quasi-democracies on an annual basis 
over the period 1950–2006. The countries included are twenty-nine OECD countries, the 27 
countries that are members of the European Union, plus Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Russia, and Serbia and Montenegro.  
The RAI is composed of two pillars, which capture respectively the degree of authority exerted by a 
regional government over its territory (self-rule) and over the whole country (shared-rule). Self-rule 
regards the degree of independence of the regional government from the influence of central 
authorities and the scope of regional decision-making. In turn, shared-rule measures the capacity of 
the regional government to determine central decision-making (Gary Marks et al., 2008). It is worth 
stressing that despite the name of the indicator, the RAI refers not only to administrative 
                                                          
5 Note that the authors call this index “quality of government index” since they use the provision of local public 
goods as a proxy for the quality of regional government. Our focus here is instead on the quality of local public 
services themselves, exploiting the heterogeneity in their organizational structure across regions. 
6 In the paper we will refer to overall performance to refer to the overall index, and to quality to refer to the 
single pillar ‘quality’. 
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decentralization but it also encompasses measures of political and fiscal decentralization. As such, it 
is possibly the most comprehensive indicator of regional autonomy that has been so far developed. 
A measure of national diversity 
We calculated our measure of diversity by taking data from the census of 2011,7 which considers for 
each region the following categories of citizens: native citizens, foreign EU residents, and foreign 
non-EU residents (including stateless). A typical measure of diversity can be obtained by subtracting 
1 to the Herfindal index of the variable of interest. In our case, this becomes (1 - Herfindal index of 
nationality shares), an approach also followed by others, e.g. Ozgen et al., (2013, 2014). A cursory 
look at the diversity indicators reveals a normal-shaped distribution with a tail on the right side that 
reflects the metropolitan areas of London, Brussels, and Wien. We have also calculated another 
measure of diversity, which reflects the relative importance of non-EU residents vis-à-vis EU-
residents, weighted for the share of foreign residents.8 This second indicator of diversity allows us to 
exploit the information about the EU versus non-EU nationality. The pairwise correlation among the 
two indicators of diversity is equal to 0.69. The picture thus changes, with regions from Greece, 
Spain and Italy appearing those with the higher share of non-EU residents.  
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the regions and the value for the three indicators. 
IV. Analysis and results 
 
Estimation strategy 
In order to test our hypotheses, we estimate a cross-section model of 167 regions in Europe 
employing ordinary least squares (OLS) method, with standard errors clustered around the region. 
The models look as follows: 
Servicesi =  + 1 diversityi +2 controlsi + i                (1) 
Servicesi =  + 1 controlsi +2 reg_autonomyi + 3 diversityi + 4 reg_autonomyi*diversityi + i        (2) 
 
Eq. 1 tests the first hypothesis (coefficient 1), while eq. 2, which includes an interaction effect 
between regional autonomy and diversity (coefficient 4), tests the second hypothesis. 
Several control variables at the region level are included, namely: income per capita (here measured 
in PPP); three dummies variable controlling for i) bilingual region; ii) autonomous region9; iii) capital 
region; the (log of) population. A customary variable which is taken into account in political economy 
                                                          
7 Data can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/CensusHub2/query.do?step=selectHyperCube&qhc=false. 
8 This index is calculated as follows: (non-EUresidents / EUresidents) * (non-EUresidents + EUresidents) / 
(domestic residents). The first factor - (non-EUresidents / EUresidents) – reflects the relative importance of 
extra-EU residents on EU residents; this then get weighted by the share of overall foreign residents - (non-
EUresidents + EUresidents) – on total domestic population (domestic residents). In this way the index reflects 
the relative importance of non-EU residents weighted for the share of foreign residents in the region. 
9 While this variable is clearly correlated with our measure of regional authority (rate of correlation equal to 
0.20), autonomous regions often tend to receive considerable transfer from central states, thus it is important 
to control for this specific status. 
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studies is the presence of strong and independent media, since they are considered an important 
channel through which citizens can monitor the local policy makers. For this reason we have 
included the variable ‘independent media’ which reflects “the strength and effectiveness of the 
media in the region to expose corruption” and is part of the same QOG Survey. We also employ the 
share of citizens with tertiary education, as an overall proxy of the level of education of the people 
living in the region. Finally, we introduce our measure of diversity – the diversity index. Eq. 2 includes 
the same control variables, but it further includes our measure of regional autonomy jointly with the 
diversity index (Table A2 reports the descriptive statistics and the correlation table of our variables). 
Local public services, diversity and regional autonomy 
Table 1 reports the results of our estimates of the model above (1). Column (1) reports the results 
for the overall index of local services, while the others report the results for each of the indicators, 
impartiality (2), corruption (3) and quality of the services (4). The coefficients of the control variables 
are in line with what expected. Income per capita predicts high scores in the provision of local 
services. Autonomous regions seem to be negatively correlated with public services, although the 
coefficients are never significant. Being a capital region, along with the size of the region (as 
measured by population), are negatively correlated with services; this might depend on the presence 
of congestions effects. The presence of independent media is positively correlated with services, 
while the level of education is instead negatively correlated with the dependent variable (we discuss 
this further below).   
By focussing on the explanatory variable - our measure of diversity - the related coefficient is 
negative and significant for the overall provision of public services (significant at 5%), corruption 
(significant at 10%), and their quality (significant at 1%). This supports our hypothesis no. 1. 
 [Table 1] 
There are two issues that can undermine the robustness of our baseline estimates. The first is an 
issue of endogeneity stemming from the presence of sorting phenomena. In fact, the demographic 
composition of a jurisdiction can be endogenous to the extent that it is affected by decision on 
public spending; this can be particularly relevant at the region level (Stichnoth and Straeten, 2013). 
We tackle the endogeneity issue by employing the following approach. We replace the current 
depend variable with the same variable, but calculated as an average of the contiguous regions, 
excluding the cases in which contiguous regions belong to a different country. The idea is that the 
measure of provision of local public services is very much correlated with the same measure of 
neighboured regions; in fact, the pairwise correlation is equal to 0.90. However, the sorting effect is 
expected to be quite local in nature, and therefore self-contained within the regions. Table 2 reports 
the estimates calculated for the main pillar “overall services” and the pillar “quality of services”, 
employing the new dependents variables. In both cases the coefficient is still negative and 
significant. 
[Table 2] 
As explained above, the performance of local public services is based on a survey, and thus is a 
subjective measure. One can hence question to what extent it reflects the real functioning of local 
public goods of the perceived functioning of local public goods. More importantly, one can question 
whether diversity affects the perception of the provision of local public services, and in which 
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direction. So the question becomes the following: are more diverse communities more incline to 
have a negative perception of the provision of local public services, for any objective performance in 
the provision of public services? One issue could be competition among nationalities or ethnic 
groups. If one nationality, or one ethnic group, is the greatest beneficiary of public services (for 
example public housing of public school), this could amplify the negative perception of the rest of 
the community. In fact, citizens are less inclined to share public goods among different ethnic groups 
(e.g. Alesina and Ferrara, 2005).   
In this second set of estimates we interact our measure of diversity with two variables, namely the 
presence of independent media and the level of education. Table 3 reports the same estimates as for 
Table 1, but with the inclusion of the following interaction term: presence of independent 
media#diversity (column1), and the level of education#diversity (column 2). The rationale is that 
both independent media and the level of education should mitigate the presence of bias in the 
perception, if present. More independent media will provide more impartial information for citizens, 
whilst more educated people should be better equipped to process public information objectively. 
By looking at the results, only the presence of independent media seems to moderate the negative 
effect of diversity on services. As the chart in figure 1 shows, the negative effect of diversity on 
services gets close to zero and then turn positive (although not statistically significant) as long as the 
variable independent media grows. This militates in favour of some degree of mis-perception which 
gets attenuated when there are independent media in the region. 
[Table 3] 
[Figure 1] 
We now turn to our second hypothesis, which states that the presence of regional autonomy is 
expected to moderate between diversity and the performance of local public services. In order to 
test the moderating effect of regional authority we include the variable diversity#regional 
autonomy. Table 4 reports the estimate of the model as in the eq. 2, for the main index of services 
and the three pillars – impartiality, corruption and quality. The coefficient of the joint effect of 
diversity and regional autonomy is positive and significant (at 5%) limited to the case of the quality 
of services (column 4). By looking at figure 2 reporting the average marginal effect of diversity along 
the levels of regional autonomy, it arises that the negative correlation of diversity with the quality of 
local public services gets closer to zero for high levels of regional autonomy. In regions in which 
regional autonomy is quite high (higher than 18.5), the marginal effect of diversity is still moderately 
negative but not longer significant. This suggests the presence of some moderating effect of regional 
autonomy on the relationship between diversity and the quality of local public services, although 
limited to their quality. 
[Table 4] 
[Figure 2] 
We have also calculated an indicator of diversity that exploits the important distinction in the census 
about foreign EU citizens and foreign non-EU citizens. As explained above this index reflects the 
relative importance of non-EU residents, weighted for the share of foreign residents in the region. 
Here the idea is that the category of non-EU residents is ‘more diverse’ that the category of EU 
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residents, for example by language, ethnicity, and level of wealth. According to the theory reviewed 
above, this should accentuate the problems for the provision of public goods and local public 
services.  
Table 5 summarizes the same estimates run above with the new index as an explanatory variable. 
There are no relevant differences in the baseline model, with diversity still negatively correlated with 
the services, also confirmed in the subsequent approach. We can instead observe differences in the 
absence of a moderating role of education and the presence of independent media. Further, in this 
case regional authority does not seem to be able to mediate between services and diversity; if 
anything, we detect a negative marginal effect of regional author in the case of the pillar corruption.  
Summing up, by taking a measure that takes into account the relative weight of non-EU citizens with 
respect to EU citizens the first hypothesis is still holding, while the second one is not confirmed.  
V. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Dealing with diversity in the European regions has become imperative in the European and national 
policy agendas. Internal mobility is a cornerstone of the EU policy, and the more new members will 
join the EU, the more migration within EU is bound to grow. Additionally, migration from outside the 
EU borders is also going to become more and more relevant. Empirical studies carried out mostly in 
the Unites States and in some developing countries have by and large found that when ethnic 
diversity grows, the welfare state, the provision of public goods, and income redistribution tend to 
become more problematic. For the European countries and regions, this is going to be one of the 
most relevant issues to deal with in the coming years.     
This paper provides evidence that i) the presence of a heterogeneous composition of population in 
the European regions is associated to a relatively worse performance in the provision of local public 
goods; and ii) regional autonomy (to some extent) can act as a moderating mechanism between 
diversity and local public services. 
The first result is in line with theories about diversity and public policy, and with several empirical 
studies that detected a negative correlation between diversity and the provision of public goods. As 
a matter of fact, most of this research has been carried out in cities and countries with a high 
presence of ethic heterogeneity, as for instance in some American cities, and in some developing 
countries; to our knowledge this is the first attempt carried out across a large sample of European 
regions.  
Another difference of this study is that our measure of diversity does not take into account ethnicity, 
but it is limited to the nationality. One the one hand this has some clear limitations, in that ethnic 
diversity is a remarkable source of heterogeneity. However, our broader measure of diversity allows 
us to address one of the cornerstone of European integration, that of the internal mobility of the 
labour force. Internal mobility has been often identified by policy makers as a fundamental driver of 
reciprocal learning, carrier of knowledge, as well as a great means to make labour market work more 
efficiently, by reducing disparities in the rates of unemployment across European countries. As such, 
the internal mobility of citizens is regarded as a pillar of social cohesion in Europe. However, recent 
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debates have recalled the attention to a number of problems that internal migration can create on 
the sustainability of the welfare states of recipient countries. Within this context, our evidence raises 
an issue for policy makers. This is going to be further exacerbated by the fact that since our data 
refer to 2011, it is more than likely that diversity has increased ever since, both because of an 
increase in the mobility within Europe since the burst of the financial crisis in 2008, as well as due to 
the recent surge in migration from outside the EU. This calls for future research with updated census 
data. 
It is also possible that our data underestimate the pressure on the welfare state of illegal 
immigrants, since they are not capture by data on foreign residents, but at the same time they can 
benefit from some local public services, particularly public health. Finally, we do not take into 
account within-country mobility which can in some cases be an additional source of diversity and 
pressure on local welfare. 
Our second piece of evidence shows that regional authority can moderately work as a moderator 
between diversity and the provision of local services. This partially confirms one of the main claims 
of fiscal federalism theory, according to which bringing political authority and administration closer 
to the people is effective, particularly when there are heterogeneous local communities which are 
likely to be reflected in heterogeneous preferences. In these cases, regional authority should be 
more effective than centralization in making local public policies more responsive to the 
heterogeneous preferences. There are counter arguments that are worth mentioning. Firstly, local 
governments can be more easily captured, as well as corrupted, by local constituencies. Secondly, in 
times of crisis and budget constraints, regional governments can have fewer resources to devote to 
the welfare. Hence, it is possible that central governments are more effective than regional 
governments in dealing with a swift increase in the demand for local public services, to the extent 
that they are able mobilize a larger amount of resources. Further, more centralized governments can 
be better equipped in managing migration flows than more decentralized ones, for example by 
being able to better redistribute immigrants, thus avoiding excessive concentrations in some 
regions. These are open questions that remain to be explored at greater lengths and with more 
recent data.    
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Tables and figures for the text 
 
Table 1 - Impartiality, regional autonomy and diversity (OLS estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 overall impartiality corruption quality 
Diversity index -1.615** 
(0.799) 
1.559 
(1.186) 
-1.609* 
(0.929) 
-3.473*** 
(0.842) 
     
Income per capita 1.453*** 
(0.108) 
0.522*** 
(0.159) 
1.155*** 
(0.122) 
0.865*** 
(0.170) 
     
Bilingual region 0.200 
(0.188) 
0.506 
(0.314) 
0.481*** 
(0.170) 
0.326 
(0.265) 
     
Autonomous region -0.266 
(0.230) 
-0.149 
(0.227) 
-0.233 
(0.177) 
-0.121 
(0.259) 
     
Capital region -0.433* 
(0.220) 
-0.409 
(0.259) 
-0.516* 
(0.276) 
-0.130 
(0.187) 
     
Population of the region -0.414*** 
(0.129) 
-0.211 
(0.157) 
-0.277** 
(0.120) 
-0.0911 
(0.148) 
     
Independent media -0.0402 
(0.0602) 
0.216*** 
(0.0690) 
0.176*** 
(0.0662) 
0.483*** 
(0.0661) 
     
Population with tertiary 
education 
-0.409*** 
(0.126) 
-0.246 
(0.167) 
-0.289** 
(0.129) 
-0.172 
(0.147) 
     
Constant -12.47*** 
(1.154) 
-4.576** 
(1.768) 
-10.15*** 
(1.220) 
-8.096*** 
(1.842) 
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R2 0.621 0.365 0.567 0.592 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10; ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the 
region level. 
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Table 2 – Testing dependent variable calculated as the average of the DV of the contiguous regions 
for overall performance and quality 
 (1) (2) 
 overall quality 
Diversity index (average contiguous 
regions) 
-1.311** 
(0.629) 
-2.411*** 
(0.780) 
   
Income per capita 1.473*** 
(0.0665) 
0.917*** 
(0.159) 
   
Bilingual region 0.152 
(0.150) 
0.165 
(0.262) 
   
Autonomous region -0.317** 
(0.135) 
-0.106 
(0.198) 
   
Capital region -0.350* 
(0.194) 
-0.186 
(0.202) 
   
Population of the region -0.244** 
(0.114) 
-0.00848 
(0.122) 
   
Independent media -0.0936 
(0.0610) 
0.358*** 
(0.0609) 
   
Population with tertiary education -0.320*** 
(0.103) 
-0.181 
(0.129) 
   
Constant -13.65*** 
(0.722) 
-9.344*** 
(1.660) 
Observations 167 167 
R2 0.693 0.580 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10; ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the 
region level. 
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Table 3 - testing education and the presence of independent media 
 (1) (2) 
 Quality of government Quality of government 
Diversity index # Population with tertiary 
education 
-0.315 
(0.701) 
 
 
   
Diversity index -2.699 
(2.766) 
-1.786** 
(0.752) 
   
Independent media -0.0377 
(0.0604) 
-0.236** 
(0.115) 
   
Population with tertiary education -0.371** 
(0.172) 
-0.413*** 
(0.123) 
   
Diversity index # Independent media  
 
1.613** 
(0.752) 
All controls included as for Table 1   
   
Constant -12.29*** 
(1.802) 
-12.94*** 
(1.801) 
Observations 167 167 
R2 0.622 0.632 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10; ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the 
region level. 
 
Figure 1 – The effect of diversity on the provision of local services when independent media changes 
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Table 4 – testing the moderating effect of regional authority 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 overall impartiality corruption quality 
Diversity index -1.620 2.704 -2.605 -6.647*** 
 (1.832) (2.457) (2.301) (1.765) 
     
Regional autonomy -0.00415 0.0785*** -0.00374 -0.0637*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0267) (0.0180) (0.0166) 
     
Diversity index # Regional autonomy 0.0007 -0.141 0.0721 0.270** 
 (0.136) (0.192) (0.140) (0.118) 
     
All controls included as Table 1 
 
  
Constant -12.48*** -2.406 -10.26*** -9.872*** 
 (1.196) (1.661) (1.272) (1.751) 
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R2 0.621 0.446 0.568 0.621 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10; ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the 
region level. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – The effect of diversity on the on provision of local services when regional autonomy 
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Table 5 – robustness test using a revised index of diversity (share non-EU/EU) 
Baseline model (as for Table 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 overall impartiality corruption quality 
Diversity index: share non-
EU/EU 
-0.126*** 
(0.0462) 
0.0889 
(0.0620) 
-0.0857 
(0.0683) 
-0.289*** 
(0.0525) 
     
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R2 0.628 0.364 0.565 0.638 
 
Different dependent variable model (as for Table 2) 
 (1) (2) 
 overall_IV quality_IV 
Diversity index: share 
nonEU/EU 
-0.0903** 
(0.0399) 
-0.227*** 
(0.0530) 
   
Observations 167 167 
R2 0.696 0.618 
 
 
Testing perception (as for Table 3) 
 (1) (2) 
 Quality of government Quality of government 
Diversity index: share nonEU/EU # Population 
with tertiary education 
0.00647 
(0.0434) 
 
 
   
Diversity index: share nonEU/EU -0.126 
(0.160) 
-0.144*** 
(0.0506) 
   
Population with tertiary education -0.379*** 
(0.144) 
-0.403*** 
(0.113) 
   
Diversity index: share nonEU/EU # Independent 
media 
 
 
0.0375 
(0.0428) 
   
Observations 167 167 
R2 0.631 0.633 
 
 
Interaction model (as for Table 4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 overall impartiality corruption quality 
Diversity index nonEU/EU -0.0302 0.0380 0.126 -0.297** 
 (0.0844) (0.111) (0.116) (0.121) 
     
Regional autonomy -0.0268 0.0675** -0.0549** -0.0239 
 (0.0236) (0.0261) (0.0237) (0.0250) 
     
Diversity#reg. autonomy -0.0101 0.00217 -0.0224** 0.00249 
 (0.00814) (0.00946) (0.00888) (0.00968) 
     
Constant -13.13*** -2.428 -8.830*** -12.68*** 
 (1.683) (2.113) (1.909) (2.139) 
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R2 0.632 0.444 0.584 0.656 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10;  ** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. All 
controls are included as for Table 1. 
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Appendix - Table A1 – list of the regions and the three indicators
20 
 
 
Region
Index of public 
services Diversity Index Regional Authority Index Region
Index of public 
services Diversity Index Regional Authority Index
AT_Burgenland 1.274 0.114 18 IT_Emilia-Romagna -0.341 0.190 13
AT_Lower Austria 1.160 0.134 18 IT_Toscana -0.550 0.163 13
AT_Vienna 0.993 0.362 18 IT_Umbria -0.190 0.183 13
AT_Carinthia 0.880 0.136 18 IT_Marche -0.460 0.161 13
AT_Styria 0.848 0.132 18 IT_Lazio -1.267 0.146 13
AT_Upper Austria 1.139 0.156 18 IT_Abruzzo -0.908 0.100 13
AT_Salzburg 0.907 0.228 18 IT_Molise -1.236 0.050 13
AT_Tyrol 1.015 0.202 18 IT_Campania -2.318 0.050 13
AT_Vorarlberg 1.069 0.238 18 IT_Puglia -1.735 0.040 13
BE_Brussels-Capital Region -0.369 0.491 18 IT_Basilicata -1.259 0.044 13
BE_Flemish Region 0.942 0.179 20 IT_Calabria -2.189 0.065 13
BE_Walloon Region -0.008 0.175 18 IT_Sicilia -1.828 0.049 17
BG_Severozapaden -2.566 0.006 1 IT_Sardegna -0.887 0.037 17
BG_Severen tsentralen -2.061 0.009 1 NL_Northern Netherlands 1.625 0.075 15
BG_Severoiztochen -0.915 0.013 1 NL_Eastern Netherlands 1.179 0.036 15
BG_Yugoiztochen -2.141 0.010 1 NL_Western Netherlands 1.273 0.053 15
BG_Yugozapaden -1.830 0.014 1 NL_Southern Netherlands 1.077 0.123 15
BG_Yuzhen tsentralen -1.088 0.008 1 PL_Lodzkie -0.846 0.005 8
CZ_Prague -0.903 0.256 7 PL_Mazowieckie -0.996 0.010 8
CZ_Central Bohemian Region -0.224 0.094 7 PL_Malopolskie -0.875 0.004 8
CZ_Jihozápad (Southwest) -0.009 0.076 7 PL_Slaskie -1.115 0.003 8
CZ_Severozápad (Northwest) -0.909 0.091 7 PL_Lubelskie -0.904 0.004 8
CZ_Severov?chod (Northeast) -0.110 0.063 7 PL_Podkarpackie -0.852 0.003 8
CZ_Jihovchod (Southeast) -0.441 0.059 7 PL_Swietokrzyskie -0.804 0.002 8
CZ_Stední Morava (Central Moravia) -0.534 0.031 7 PL_Podlaskie -0.962 0.006 8
CZ_Moravian-Silesian Region -0.361 0.038 7 PL_Wielkopolskie -0.999 0.003 8
DK_Hovedstaden 1.306 0.176 10 PL_Zachodniopomorskie -0.867 0.005 8
DK_Sjlland 1.448 0.080 10 PL_Lubuskie -0.929 0.006 8
DK_Syddanmark 1.440 0.100 10 PL_Dolnoslaskie -1.116 0.006 8
DK_Midtjylland 1.687 0.099 10 PL_Opolskie -0.611 0.005 8
DK_Nordjylland 1.317 0.080 10 PL_Kujawsko-Pomorskie -0.949 0.003 8
DE_Baden-Württemberg 0.981 0.205 21 PL_Warminsko-Mazurskie -0.668 0.003 8
DE_Bavaria 0.712 0.184 21 PL_Pomorskie -0.858 0.004 8
DE_Berlin 0.981 0.205 21 PT_Norte -0.322 0.028 1
DE_Brandenburg 0.979 0.032 21 PT_Algarve 0.208 0.211 1
DE_Bremen 0.953 0.196 21 PT_Centro -0.029 0.046 1
DE_Hamburg 0.961 0.219 21 PT_Lisboa 0.141 0.135 1
DE_Hessen 0.630 0.202 21 PT_Alentejo 0.738 0.061 1
DE_Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.937 0.174 21 PT_Acores 0.512 0.027 16
DE_Lower Saxony 0.949 0.142 21 PT_Madeira 0.280 0.041 16
DE_North Rhine-Westphalia 0.714 0.037 21 RO_North-West -1.135 0.004 4
DE_Rhineland-Palatinate 0.827 0.037 21 RO_Centru -1.581 0.002 4
DE_Saarland 1.051 0.141 21 RO_North-East -2.014 0.003 4
DE_Saxony 1.096 0.141 21 RO_South-East -2.035 0.002 4
DE_Saxony-Anhalt 0.866 0.141 21 RO_South-Muntenia -1.774 0.001 4
DE_Schleswig-Holstein 1.273 0.059 21 RO_Bucharest-Ilfov -2.964 0.011 4
DE_Thuringia 1.336 0.051 21 RO_South-West Oltenia -1.478 0.001 4
FR_ille de France 0.547 0.226 8 RO_West -2.250 0.005 4
FR_Champagne-Ardenne 0.185 0.074 8 SK_Bratislava Region -0.572 0.095 4
FR_Picardie 0.471 0.064 8 SK_Western Slovakia -0.863 0.128 4
FR_Haute-Normandie 0.123 0.056 8 SK_Central Slovakia -0.766 0.166 4
FR_Centre 0.613 0.081 8 SK_Eastern Slovakia -0.769 0.182 4
FR_Basse-Normandie 0.502 0.039 8 ES_Galicia 0.574 0.073 15
FR_Bourgogne 0.485 0.076 8 ES_Asturias 0.512 0.086 15
FR_Nord-Pas-de-Calais 0.544 0.063 8 ES_Basque Community 0.665 0.123 16
FR_Lorraine 0.244 0.099 8 ES_Navarre 0.173 0.188 16
FR_Alsace 0.475 0.143 8 ES_La Rioja 0.243 0.246 15
FR_Franche-Comté 0.494 0.086 8 ES_Aragon 0.320 0.223 15
FR_Pays de la Loire 0.357 0.040 8 ES_Madrid -0.098 0.261 15
FR_Bretagne 1.043 0.039 8 ES_Castile-Leon -0.055 0.122 15
FR_Poitou-Charentes 0.768 0.054 8 ES_Castile-La Mancha 0.208 0.189 15
FR_Aquitaine 0.820 0.083 8 ES_Extremadura 0.416 0.068 15
FR_Midi-Pyrénées 0.394 0.089 8 ES_Catalonia -0.464 0.264 15
FR_Limousin 0.727 0.085 8 ES_Valencian Community 0.154 0.268 15
FR_Rhine-Alpes 0.800 0.122 8 ES_Balearic Islands 0.109 0.342 15
FR_Auvergne 0.563 0.063 8 ES_Andalusia 0.284 0.148 15
FR_Languedoc-Roussillon 0.536 0.110 8 ES_Region of Murcia -0.036 0.270 15
FR_Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 0.215 0.119 8 ES_Canarias 0.272 0.239 15
FR_Corse 0.123 0.159 8 SE_East Sweden 1.376 0.185 10
GR_Voreia Ellada -1.389 0.118 10 SE_South Sweden 1.453 0.114 10
GR_Kentriki Ellada -1.069 0.118 10 SE_North Sweden 1.260 0.097 10
GR_Attica -0.261 0.193 10 UK_North East. England 0.919 0.045 4
GR_Nisia Aigaiou. Kriti -0.912 0.208 10 UK_North West. England 1.040 0.067 4
HU_Central Hungary -1.018 0.049 10 UK_Yorkshire and the Humber. Eng. 0.652 0.099 4
HU_Transdanubia -0.320 0.025 10 UK_East Midlands. England 1.245 0.131 4
HU_Great Plain and North -0.439 0.017 10 UK_West Midlands. England 0.800 0.067 4
IT_Piemonte -0.118 0.154 13 UK_East of England 0.763 0.075 4
IT_Valle d'Aosta 0.696 0.126 17 UK_London. England 0.484 0.362 9
IT_Liguria -0.507 0.133 13 UK_South East. England 1.082 0.124 4
IT_Lombardia -0.638 0.179 13 UK_South West. England 1.091 0.117 4
IT_Trentino-Alto Adige(Bolzano) 0.832 0.147 17 UK_Wales 0.806 0.067 12
IT_Trentino-Alto Adige(Trento) 0.538 0.162 15 UK_Scotland 1.277 0.090 17
IT_Veneto -0.462 0.174 13 UK_Northern Ireland 0.933 0.361 10
IT_Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.199 0.149 17
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Table A2 – pairwise correlation and descriptive statistics 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   N Mean SD Min Max 
1 Quality of government 1 
         
167 0.01 1.01 -2.96 1.69 
2 Diversity index 0.364 1 
        
167 0.11 0.09 0 0.49 
3 Income per capita (log) 0.723 0.628 1 
       
167 9.88 0.63 8.01 11.01 
4 Bilingual region 0.147 0.319 0.186 1 
      
167 0.08 0.28 0 1 
5 Autonomous region 0.0850 0.0650 0.115 0.510 1 
     
167 0.09 0.29 0 1 
6 Capital region -0.0645 0.288 0.221 -0.0355 -0.109 1 
    
167 0.11 0.31 0 1 
7 Population of the region (log) -0.0129 -0.0400 0.0644 -0.0794 -0.218 0.159 1 
   
167 7.6 0.86 4.8 9.8 
8 Independent media 0.332 0.227 0.468 0.137 0.186 -0.0485 -0.0209 1 
  
167 -0.02 1.01 -2.77 2.94 
9 Share of population tertiary education -0.0472 0.122 0.0687 0.0595 0.131 0.124 -0.809 0.0764 1   167 0.036 0.038 0.003 0.27 
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